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DR NICHOLAS RYDER*
Money laundering is one of those problems that is very hard to
get a grip on.1
I. MONEY LAUNDERING
THE Joint Money Laundering Steering Group defined money
laundering as the ‘‘process whereby criminals attempt to hide and
disguise the true origin and ownership of the proceeds of their criminal
activities’’.2 Money laundering is the practice of concealing assets to
avoid any discovery of the unlawful activity that fashioned them.
Money laundering has three recognisable stages – placement, layering
and integration.3 In the first stage, the money launderer introduces
the proceeds of crime into the financial system. In the second phase,
the launderer enters into several financial transactions to distance the
illegal money from its original source. In the final stage of the money
laundering cycle, the monies re-enter the economy.4 It has been argued
the phrase ‘‘money laundering’’ was first used by Al Capone in the
1930s. 5 However, Levi et al. took the view that the term money
laundering was first used in the United States in the 1920s ‘‘when street
gangs sought a seemingly legitimate explanation for the origins of the
money their rackets were generating’’.6 The Mafia added an element of
romance to the history of money laundering through a Polish man
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1 M. Yeandle, M. Mainelli, A. Berendt and B. Healy, Anti-Money Laundering Requirements:
Costs, Benefits and Perceptions (London 2005), p. 11.
2 Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, Prevention of Money Laundering / Combating the
Financing of Terrorism: Guidance for the UK Financial Sector Part I (London 2006), pp. 7–8. The
current statutory definition of money laundering is contained in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002,
ss. 327–340. For a more detailed discussion of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and money
laundering see P. De Verneuili Smith, ‘‘POCA in Practice - Issues arising from Compliance with
Pt 7 of POCA’’ (2007) 22 Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law
258–260.
3 See J. Robinson, The Laundrymen (London 1995), p. 12.
4 Ibid., at pp. 11–29 and P. Alldridge, Money Laundering Law (Oxford 2003), pp. 2–3.
5 See note 3 above at p. 4.
6 M. Levi, R. Naylor and P. Williams, Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering
(New York 1998), p. 12.
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called Meyer Lansky who was ‘‘lovingly’’ referred to as ‘‘the patron
saint of money laundering’’.7 The earliest reported use of the term in a
legal context was in the US in 1982 in the case of US v. $4,225,625.39.8
However, it was not until 1986 that money laundering became a
criminal offence in the US by virtue of the Money Laundering Control
Act 1986.9 It only received world wide attention as a result of the
international community’s attempt to counteract the illegal drugs
trade in the 1980s and the establishment of the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) in 1989.10 The first anti-money laundering (AML)
legislation in the United Kingdom (UK) occurred in 1986 by virtue of
the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 (DTOA 1986).11 These laws
have since been expanded to include criminalising the laundering of
the proceeds of a wide range of other criminal offences.12 In 1993 the
European Union recognised the importance of tackling money
laundering and imposed a series of specific AML obligations on
financial institutions.13
Due to its secretive nature, the actual amount of laundered money
is impossible to calculate and it has led to claims that it is one of the
world’s largest industries.14 Spalek claims that the amount is
approximately $500bn,15 while Maylam estimated that the annual
figure could be as much as $1.5trn.16 Estimates of the amount of
money laundered annually in the UK range from £19bn to £48bn.17
However, van Duyne has questioned the accuracy of such estimates
7 See note 3 above at p. 3.
8 (1982) 551 F Supp.314. See also B. Buchanan, ‘‘Money Laundering – a Global Obstacle’’ (2004)
18 Research in International Business and Finance 115, at 120.
9 This Act was a direct response to the case of US v. Anzalone (1985) 766 F.2d 676 1st Cir.
10 J. Johnson and Y. C. D. Lim, ‘‘Money Laundering: Has the Financial Action Task Force made a
Difference’’ (2004) 10 Journal of Financial Crime 7–22. For a more detailed commentary on the
international response to money laundering see M. Gill and G. Taylor, ‘‘Preventing Money
Laundering or Obstructing Business’’ (2004) 44 British Journal of Criminology 582–594, at
583.
11 The Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 has been amended by the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, the Criminal justice (International
Co-operation) Act 1990, the Criminal Justice Act 1993, the Drug Trafficking Act 1994, the
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995 and the Crime and
Disorder Act 1998.
12 See for example the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
13 European Council, Directive on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System to Launder
Money 91/308, 1993 O.J. (L 166). This Directive was implemented by Money Laundering
Regulations 1993, S.I. 1993/1933. For a more detailed commentary and analysis on the EU
legislative framework and policy towards the prevention of money laundering see V. Mitsilegas
and B. Gilmore, ‘‘The EU Legislative Framework against Money Laundering and Terrorist
Funding: a Critical Analysis in Light of the Evolving Global Standards’’, (2007) 56 International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 119–140.
14 See note 3 above at p. 4.
15 R. Spalek, ‘‘Regulation, White–Collar Crime and the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International’’ (2001) 40 Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 166–179, at 167.
16 S. Maylam, ‘‘Prosecution for Money Laundering in the UK’’ (2002) 10 Journal of Financial
Crime 157–158, at 158.
17 J. Harvey, ‘‘An Evaluation of Money Laundering Policies’’ (2005) Journal of Money Laundering
Control 8(4) 339–345, at 340.
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and stated that if they were true ‘‘the visible effects [of money
laundering] would be far more obvious’’.18 Gallant also concluded that
‘‘any attempt to measure money laundering is, of course, fraught with
methodological difficulty’’.19 Attempts to calculate accurately the
extent of money laundering are also hindered because there are so
many different ways that organised criminals launder money. For
instance, Kennedy identified over 20 methods including cash couriers,
cash conversion, domestic bank accounts, credit cards, wire transfers,
alternative remittance systems, precious metals and gems, casinos and
shell corporations.20 The level of sophistication was commented upon
by the FSA who stated that money launderers are utilising even more
complicated techniques through a larger number of financial transac-
tions and shell corporations in order to legitimise the proceeds of
crime.21 The most common means of laundering money in the UK are
the purchasing of property, investment in front companies, high levels
of conspicuous consumption and moving large amounts of cash to
foreign jurisdictions.22 Money laundering is now regarded as a
multinational phenomenon where extremely disciplined and well
funded organised criminals manipulate national AML rules to move
their proceeds of crime.23 It is evident that a large number of
mechanisms exist which could be exploited by organised criminals to
hide their wealth and assets without regard to international borders.24
This means that virtually any financial transaction could involve
money laundering. Therefore, money laundering is a global problem,
which needs an effective and co-ordinated international response.
The international community has implemented a series of measures
including the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,25 the statement
of principles of the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations
and Supervisory Practices,26 the 40 Recommendations of the
18 P. van Duyne, ‘‘Money Laundering: Pavlov’s Dog and beyond’’ (1998) 37 Howard Journal of
Criminal Justice 359–374, at 360.
19 M. M. Gallant, Money Laundering and the Proceeds of Crime (Cheltenham 2005), pp. 11–12.
20 A. Kennedy, ‘‘Dead Fish across the Trail: Illustrations of Money Laundering Methods’’ (2005) 8
Journal of Money Laundering Control 305–319, at 306–315. For more examples of how money
is laundered see HM Treasury, Anti Money Laundering Strategy (London 2004), p. 12 and G.
Baldwin, ‘‘The New Face of Money Laundering’’ (2003) 4 Journal of Investment Compliance
38–41.
21 FSA, Consultation Paper 46 Money Laundering – The FSA’s new role (London 2000), p. 10.
22 NCIS, UK Threat Assessment (London 2003), p. 53.
23 K. Alexander, ‘‘The International Anti-Money Laundering Regime: the Role of the Financial
Action Task Force’’ (2001) 4 Journal of Money Laundering Control 231–248, at 233.
24 Ibid., at p. 231.
25 D. P. Stewart, ‘‘Internationalising the War on Drugs: United Nations Convention against Illicit
traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances’’ (1990) 18 Denver Journal of
International Law and Policy 387–404, at 388.
26 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle 1997).
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FATF,27 the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search,
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime and three
European Money Laundering Directives to reduce the extent of
money laundering. Some of these international measures impose
specific AML obligations on nation states. For example, in the UK,
the AML legislative framework is spread across a plethora of
statutes including the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (PCA 2002), the
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCPA 2005) and
three sets of Money Laundering Regulations. This type of legislative
framework is overcomplicated and the UK would benefit from a
single money laundering act.
Whilst there has been a specific AML obligation in the UK since
the DTOA 1986, there has not been any attempt to prevent money
laundering in the legislation regulating the financial services sector.
This is somewhat surprising especially if one undertakes an historical
investigation of the financial services industry; it is littered with
instances of scandals involving money laundering. Examples include
the infamous collapse of the Bank of Credit Commerce International,
the failure of Barings Bank, Mexican banks’ involvement in
laundering drug money and the Bank of New York’s alleged
involvement in money laundering for the Russian mafia.28 The
Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) took the view that
organised criminals ‘‘seek to exploit financial institutions, particularly
at the placement stage of money laundering’’.29 Financial services
legislation in the UK has ignored money laundering; financial
regulatory bodies have not been given the appropriate enforcement
powers or even a clear legislative mandate to tackle money laundering.
For example, the Financial Services Act 1986 (FSA 1986) did not
impose any AML obligations on firms authorised under the Act, or
provide the Securities and Investment Board (SIB) with any specific
AML powers. Any persons who acted in the course of a relevant
business, which included investment business,30 were only required to
comply with the money laundering reporting aspects of the DTOA Act
1986.31 This was the position until the 1993 Money Laundering
27 FATF, Forty Recommendations (available from www.fatf-gati.org). The FATF has also made
recommendations in relation to the funding of terrorism. See FATF, Nine Special
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (available from www.fatf-gati.org). For a more
detailed commentary and analysis of the international attempts to reduce money laundering
see A. V. M. Leong, ‘‘Chasing Dirty Money: Domestic and International Measures against
Money Laundering’’ (2007) 10 Journal of Money Laundering Control 141–156, at
145–153.
28 See note 10 above at p. 7 and note 19 above at pp. 11–14.
29 SOCA, The UK Threat Assessment of Serious Organised Crime (London 2006), para. 4.10.
30 As defined in the Financial Services Act 1986, s. 1(2).
31 Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, s. 24. See D. G. McCormack, ‘‘Money Laundering and
Banking Secrecy’’ (1995) 16 Company Lawyer 6–10, at 7.
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Regulations (MLR 1993) were implemented.32 Under these regulations
any person or firm who conducts investment business, or who forms a
business relationship or carries on a one-off transaction with or for
another person, as defined in the FSA 1986, must comply with these
regulations.33 The SIB did not play an active role in enforcing the
provisions of the MLR 1993 against those firms who it authorised
under the 1986 Act.34 The prosecutorial role of the SIB was limited to
breaches relating to the authorisation to conduct investment business
and insider dealing. It did not extend to money laundering.35 The
performance of the SIB has been criticised by some commentators
because it paid little or no attention to its supervisory role towards
tackling or even preventing financial crime.36 FSMA 2000 represents a
bold and innovative attempt by the government to tackle the extent of
money laundering in the UK. Under section 6, the FSA has a statutory
duty to reduce money laundering by ensuring that financial institu-
tions have systems and practices in place to protect themselves against
being used as vehicles to launder money by financial criminals. This
was a timely change and it is to this statutory objective that this article
now turns.
II. SECTION 6 AND THE REDUCTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING
Financial crime is broadly defined within FSMA 2000. It incorporates
any offence including fraud or dishonesty,37 misconduct in, or misuse
of information relating to, a financial market;38 or handling the
proceeds of crime.39 This definition also includes an extra-territorial
dimension, which criminalises overseas conduct that would be an
offence if it had taken place in the UK.40 The statutory objective
requires the FSA to work with criminal law intelligence and
prosecution agencies.41 The principal objective of the FSA has been
32 See note 13 above. The 1993 Directive was amended in 2003 by the Money Laundering
Regulations 2003, S.I. 2003/3075. The EU published the Third Money Laundering Directive
(2005/60), which was implemented via the Money Laundering Regulations 2007, S.I. 2007/2157.
See HM Treasury, Implementing the Third Money Laundering Directive: Draft Money Laundering
Regulations 2007 (London 2007).
33 See note 13 above at Regulation 4 (1)(f).
34 For a more detailed commentary on the enforcement of the obligations under the MLR 1993 see
note 4 above at pp. 205–206 and note 16 above at p. 157.
35 For a more detailed discussion of the enforcement policy of the SIB towards insider dealing see
A. Alcock, ‘‘Insider Dealing – How did we get here?’’ (1994) 15 Company Lawyer 67–72. For a
more recent commentary see B. Dubow and N. Monteiro, Measuring Market Cleanliness – FSA
Occasional Paper 23 (London 2006).
36 See generally B. A. K. Rider, ‘‘Policing the City – Combating Fraud and Other Abuses in the
Corporate Securities Industry’’ (1988) 41 Current Legal Problems 47–68.
37 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 6 (3)(a).
38 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 6 (3)(b).
39 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 6 (3)(c).
40 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 6 (4).
41 See for example FSA, Partnership Agreement between the National Criminal Intelligence Service
and the Finanial Services Authority (London 2001).
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to focus on the AML systems and controls that the regulated sector
has in place.42 In April 2000, the FSA published a consultation paper
outlining its money laundering role, the proposed rules, its systems
and controls.43 In order to regulate effectively such a wide range of
firms the FSA sets standards with which the regulated sector must
comply. The FSA has the power to make rules in relation to money
laundering and the ability to prosecute organisations and individuals
for breaches of its regulations under the Money Laundering, or ML
part of its Handbook.44
A. Risk Based Money Laundering Policy
The FSA outlined its risk based approach towards financial regulation
in 1997 when it stated that it would assume an adaptable method of
supervision by targeting specific business practices and the level of risk
associated with certain markets and firms.45 This means that a firm
will be able to allocate its resources in a cost effective and
proportionate way so that it can focus on the most relevant risks
from money laundering that it faces. The FSA has adopted a two stage
policy. Firstly, it has devised a list of services and products that
categorise risk status and secondly, it has put in place a new set of
procedures to ensure that firms verify the identity of a client.46 The risk
based approach between the FSA and the regulated sector will vary
between the ‘‘highest’’ and ‘‘lowest’’ at risk firms. According to the
FSA the most at risk sections of the financial services industry are
international banking and high risk jurisdictions, domestic banking,
independent financial advisers, online stockbrocking, spread betting
and credit unions.47 The highest risk firms will benefit from what is
best described as a ‘‘continuous relationship’’ with the FSA in terms of
their AML obligations, while the lower risk firms will have a ‘‘remote
relationship’’.48 In order for this to work, it is essential that firms
42 A. Proctor, ‘‘Supporting a Risk-based Anti-Money Laundering Approach through Enforcement
Action’’ (2004) 13 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 10–14, at 11. Members of
the regulated sector are defined in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated
Activities) Order 2001 S.I. 2001/544.
43 See note 21 above at p. 4. The FSA has a statutory objective to consult where it proposes to
make any rules, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 155.
44 The FSA has the power to prosecute for breaches of the 2003 Money Laundering Regulations
under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 402.
45 FSA, Financial Services Authority – An Outline (London 1997), p. 31. A risk based approach
toward money laundering is also an integral part of the international community’s policy
towards reducing levels of money laundering. See S. Ross and M. Hannan, ‘‘Money Laundering
Regulation and Risk-based Decision Making’’ (2007) 10 Journal of Money Laundering Control
106–115, at 107.
46 M. Gill and G. Taylor, ‘‘The Risk-based Approach to Tackling Money Laundering: Matching
Risk to Products’’ (2003) 24 Company Lawyer 210–213, at 212.
47 See FSA Press Release, Tackling the risk of money laundering in the financial services industry,
FSA/PN/100/2001, July 30 2001, available from www.fsa.gov.uk.
48 C. Sergeant, ‘‘Risk-based Regulation in the Financial Services Authority’’ (2002) 10 Journal of
Financial Regulation and Compliance 329–335, at 333.
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continuously identify the risks of entering into certain financial
transactions which are used in the process of money laundering.49 The
FSA hoped that a risk based approach would lift the regulatory
burdens and reduce the AML compliance costs on the regulated
sector.50 The government has also strongly advocated that ‘‘a risk
based approach will keep the compliance costs to an absolute
minimum’’.51 However, the AML regime introduced by the FSA is
not cost effective. The compliance costs for the regulated sector have
increased by 60% since the introduction of the FSA AML
regulations.52 This approach has not worked because the regulated
sector is facing spiralling AML compliance costs as the FSA attempts
to reduce money laundering.
A controversial issue regarding the risk based approach is that it
requires the regulated sector to act as front line financial policemen
and become involved in crime prevention. Is the regulated sector the
most appropriate mechanism to reduce money laundering? For this
approach to succeed, the FSA is heavily reliant upon the good will of
firms, senior managers, directors and employees. The good will is
becoming progressively more difficult to obtain from the sector which
is already sceptical of the general effectiveness of the risk-based AML
regime introduced by the FSA. However, there are a number of
advantages to the risk based approach, from which the regulated
sector would benefit from. For example, this approach would reduce
the number of SARs submitted to SOCA, it provides the regulated
sector with great flexibility and it transfers responsibility from the FSA
to the regulated sector so that they can implement the most
appropriate AML regime.53 It is extremely difficult, if not impossible
to quantify if the risk based approach towards the reduction of money
laundering has worked. What can be concluded is that this approach
has failed to meet its optimum objective, to reduce the AML costs of
the regulated sector. Therefore, the FSA must seek to produce a more
cost effective and streamlined AML regime by allowing the regulated
sector greater flexibility to reduce the extent of money laundering. It is
recommended that the FSA produces a set of guidelines which allows
the regulated sector to implement its own unique risk based AML
policy so that they have an even greater level of flexibility.
49 See note 45 above at p. 11.
50 FSA, Financial Risk Outlook 2006 (London 2006), p.93. Also see A. V. M. Leong, ‘‘Anti-money
laundering measures in the United Kingdom: a review of recent legislation and FSA’s risk-based
approach’’ (2007) Company Lawyer 28(2) 35–42, at 41.
51 Ruth Kelly, (2002) Speech to the Financial Services Authority Money Laundering Conference,
11th July, p.3, available from www.hm-treasury.gov.uk.
52 BBC News, 9 July 2007, Anti-laundering Expenses ‘Soar’, available from www.bbc.co.uk. Also
see KPMG, Press Release 9 July 2007, Banks battle against money laundering as market
complexity increases, available from www.kpmg.com.
53 See note 43 above at p. 107–108.
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B. Rule Making Powers
Until 2006, the rule making powers of the FSA were contained in
ML.54 Each member of the regulated sector was required, inter alia, to
have in place a money laundering reporting officer (MLRO),55
procedures to ensure the accurate identification of a client,56 internal
money laundering reporting requirements,57 the use of national and
international findings on material deficiencies in AML regimes,58 and
to ensure that members of staff were trained to detect money
laundering.59 In addition there was a series of unique provisions for
sole traders and professional firms.60 The FSA AML rules did not
change the existing procedures that the regulated sector had to have in
place under the 1993 MLR. Therefore, the rationale behind ML must
be questioned because it created an additional level of regulation for
an area of law which is complicated and fraught with practical
difficulties.61 The obligations imposed by ML were burdensome and
are counterproductive for smaller firms. The FSA’s initial approach to
the AML obligations of the regulated sector can be described as a
‘‘one size fits all’’ approach. This meant that the FSA imposed the
same level of AML obligations on the regulated sector irrespective of
their differing nature and size. This created a fear factor amongst
smaller firms who might not have the resources or experience to meet
their obligations under ML.62 For example, the first person the FSA
fined for breaches of ML was the managing director of a small
business which employed only six members of staff with 23 clients.63
The FSA found no actual evidence of money laundering or that the
firm or the managing director had intentionally misled the bank to
54 FSA, Money Laundering Handbook (London, 2006). The FSA adopted the MLR 1993 via the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 Regulations (Relating to Money Laundering
Regulations) 2001, S.I. 2001/1819.
55 Ibid., at section 2.
56 See note 54 above at section 3.
57 Ibid., at section 4.
58 See note 54 above at section 5.
59 Ibid., at section 6.
60 See note 54 above at section 8.
61 For a detailed commentary on these issues see R. E. Bell, ‘‘The Prosecution of Lawyers for
Money Laundering’’ (2002) 6 Journal of Money Laundering Control 17–26.
62 C. Nakajima, ‘‘Principle-based vs. Rule-based Regulation: The Implications for Governance’’
(2006) 27 Company Lawyer 129–130, at 129. According to the FSA, smaller firms include
general insurance firms, motor retailers, financial advisers, mortgage and other home finance
advisers, credit unions, mutual societies and friendly societies. See www.fsa.gov.uk. It has been
suggested that the FSA should adopt a diverse approach towards the different type of financial
institutions it regulates. For a critical commentary see N. Ryder, ‘‘Financial Services: Diversity is
the Key to Effective Regulation’’ (1999) 21 Business Law Review 62–65.
63 FSA Press Release, FSA fines bond broker and managing director for anti-money laundering
failures, FSA/PN/115/2005, available from www.fsa.gov.uk. The FSA imposed the penalty in
this instance in respect of breaches of Principles 2 and 3 of the FSA’s Principles for Businesses
and of Rules 2.1.1 R, 3.1.3 R (1), 3.1.3 R (2), 6.3.1 R and 7.3.2 R (1) of the FSA’s Money
Laundering Sourcebook. See FSA, Final Notice Investment Services UK Limited and Mr Ram
Melwani (London 2005).
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which they had failed to supply appropriate information about their
clients, yet a fine was imposed.64 This approach had important
implications for small entities regulated by the FSA, especially credit
unions, even though their potential for being used for money
laundering is small. A 2004 review of the AML policies used by credit
unions concluded that they were struggling to comply with the
obligations under ML.65 A credit union can be defined as a co-
operative society offering its member’s loans out of a pool of savings
built up by the members themselves.66 Credit unions are largely
operated by unpaid volunteers who manage to dedicate several hours
of their time each week to run a credit union. The importance of
volunteers cannot be underestimated because credit unions rely
exclusively upon them to serve on boards and committees.67 The
AML obligations imposed by ML meant that credit unions have to
comply with a much higher level of regulation than they were
accustomed to under the Credit Unions Act 1979 (CUA 1979). The
FSA took over the role of regulating credit unions from the Registry
of Friendly Societies (the Registry) in July 2002,68 which was
previously responsible for deciding whether to register a new credit
union.69 The Registry stated that ‘‘from the earliest days they were
obliged to take a tight grip on credit unions and hence its
development’’, therefore restricting the growth of credit unions.70
The Registry required each credit union to produce an annual return
and a valid insurance policy.71 The Registry also had limited statutory
powers of the kind available to other financial regulators to intervene
in the affairs of a credit union, or to discipline officers or employees
where things have gone wrong.72 The Registry developed an informal
and ineffective system of supervision, which relied upon the honesty of
64 See note 62 above at p. 129.
65 FSA, Money laundering – A Review of Credit Unions’ Anti-Money Laundering Systems and
Procedures (London 2004). Also see SOCA, Serious Organised Crime Agency Annual Report
2006/2007 (London 2007), p. 12.
66 R. Berthoud and T. Hinton, Credit Unions in the United Kingdom (London 1989).
67 M. Chapman, A. Boyle, F. Rutherford and F. Wager, Credit Union Training and Skills Audit
(Edinburgh 2004).
68 For a more detailed discussion on the impact of the FSA on the development of credit unions see
K. Smyth, ‘‘Union City Blues’’ (October/November 2003) Scottish Banker 27 and N. Ryder,
‘‘The Financial Services Authority and Credit Unions – A New Era of Regulation’’ (2003) 11
Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 241–249.
69 Credit Unions Act 1979, s. 1.
70 Registry of Friendly Societies, Credit Unions in Great Britain, A Review of the Years 1979–1995
(London 1996). It must be noted that there are several other well documented factors that have
affected the development of credit unions in the UK. See generally N. Ryder, ‘‘Out with the Old
and In with the New? A Critical Analysis of Contemporary Policy towards the Development of
Credit Unions in Great Britain’’ [2005] Journal of Business Law 617–639.
71 Credit Unions Act 1979, s. 15.
72 D. McKillop, J. Glass and C. Ferguson, ‘‘Investigating the Growth Performance of UK Credit
Unions Using Radial and Non-Radial Efficiency Measures’’ (2002) 26 Journal of Banking and
Finance 1563–1591, at 1582.
C.L.J. Money Laundering 643
credit union members.73 This ineffective financial regulation prompted
the government to seek an improved system for credit unions. In
November 1998 HM Treasury proposed two ways in which credit
unions should be regulated.74 Firstly, that the powers of the Registry
should be transferred to FSA,75 and secondly, that credit unions
should be brought within the scope of FSMA 2000.76 The government
opted for the latter of these options in 1999.77 Credit unions are now
subject to a higher level of regulation by the Credit Union Handbook,
or CRED. CRED contains rules and regulations relating to the FSA’s
Principles of Business, Senior Management Arrangements, Systems
and Controls, the approved persons regime, lending policies, registra-
tion and authorisation.
A review of the AML procedures of credit unions by the FSA
concluded that while there is a general awareness of their AML
requirements, credit unions’ procedures, controls and training must be
strengthened.78 The review raised serious concerns about the AML
policies of credit unions in five areas – client identification, suspicious
transaction reporting, record keeping, reports by the MLRO and
volunteer training.79 In terms of client identification, the FSA
concluded that many credit unions failed to clearly set out in their
AML policy what documents they were prepared to accept as evidence
of member identification. Furthermore, the review also noted that
several credit unions did not make it clear to their volunteers that a
report should be sent to the MLRO and that most credit unions
provided no guidance on the form and content of this report. The
review concluded that a large percentage of credit unions failed to
mention in their AML policy and related documents any guidance as
to what might constitute a suspicious transaction. The final part of the
review reported that credit unions’ policies and procedures noted that
ML compliance training was given to staff and volunteers but it was
unclear whether the training covered the required matters and how
frequently it was provided. The FSA realised that the needs of smaller
firms were different from larger members of the regulated sector and
developed an informal means of overcoming any difficulties and
potential breaches of ML. If a firm has weak AML controls, like a
credit union, the problem is now dealt with by a series of informal
73 N. Ryder, ‘‘The Financial Services Authority and Credit Unions: The Final Piece of the Jigsaw?’’
(2002) 11 Nottingham Law Journal 17–32, at 23–24.
74 HM Treasury, Proposed Amendments to the CUA 1979 – A Consultation Paper (London 1999).
75 Ibid., at p. 11.
76 See note 74 above at p. 12.
77 HM Treasury, Press Release 191/99, November 16 1999, Enhanced Role for Credit Unions,
available from www.hm-treasury.gov.uk.
78 See note 65 above at p. 2.
79 Ibid., at p. 4. This review led to the publication of a new set of guidance notes for credit unions.
See FSA, Anti-MoneyLlaundering Guide for Credit Unions (London 2004).
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discussions with the FSA. The new approach adopted by the FSA
towards enforcing the AML regulations is to offer advice and then,
only as a last resort, to use its enforcement powers. The FSA must be
commended for recognising the needs of smaller firms, especially
credit unions.
In 2005, the FSA published a consultation paper outlining its plans
to simplify the obligations under the Handbook.80 There was strong
support from the regulated sector to remove the burdensome
regulations imposed by ML and replace them with high-level
requirements for firms to have their own risk-based controls on
money laundering.81 In January 2006 the FSA announced that it was
streamlining ML,82 and it became obsolete from August 31 2006.83 ML
has been replaced with a principles-based approach in the Senior
Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls, or SYSC part of
the Handbook. Part 3 of which now provides that firms must have in
place systems and controls which are appropriate for the firm to
conduct its business.84 In particular, a firm is required to ‘‘take
reasonable care to establish and maintain effective systems and
controls for compliance with applicable requirements and standards
under the regulatory system and for countering the risk that the firm
might be used to further financial crime’’.85 Firms are therefore
required to carry out regular assessments of the adequacy of their
AML systems they have in place to prevent themselves from being
used to further financial crime,86 allocate a director or senior manager
with overall responsibility for establishing and the maintaining of the
AML system and to appoint an MLRO.87 The new AML regime is
intended to provide the regulated sector with an even higher degree of
flexibility. This means that firms are able to identify the risks and
determine how they can best allocate their resources in areas which are
most vulnerable.88 The FSA has removed the detailed AML rules
within ML and replaced them with requirements so that the regulated
sector can have their own or ‘‘personal’’ risk-based controls. This
approach might encourage and enable the regulated sector to target
their resources more appropriately on activities at risk from money
laundering, thus reducing the AML compliance costs.
80 FSA, Consultation Paper - 5/10 - Reviewing the FSA Handbook - Money Laundering, Approved
Persons, Training and Competence, and Conduct of Business (London 2005).
81 FSA Press Release, FSA to streamline rules on money laundering, FSA/PN/008/2006, January
26 2006, available from www.fsa.gov.uk. Also see FSA, Policy Statement 06/01 Reviewing our
Money Laundering Regime - Feedback on Chapter 2 of CP05/10 (London 2006) at p. 5.
82 Ibid.
83 See note 80 above at chapter 2.
84 FSA, FSA Handbook (London, 2006), at SYSC 3.1.1.
85 Ibid., at SYSC 3.2.6 R.
86 See note 84 above at SYSC 3.2.6 C.
87 Ibid., at SYSC 3.2.6 H and I.
88 See note 81 above.
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C. Investigative and Enforcement Powers
The most important tools that the FSA has in the fight against money
laundering are its investigative and enforcement powers. Part XI of
FSMA 2000 provides the FSA with extensive investigatory powers.89
The FSA has the ability to require information from firms,90 to
appoint investigators,91 to obtain the assistance of overseas financial
regulators92 and provide appointed investigators with additional
powers.93 An example of how the FSA has successfully used these
powers in respect of money laundering was the investigation into the
finances of the former leader of Nigeria, General Sani Abacha, who
was suspected of illegally withdrawing $1bn from government funds.
The FSA investigation identified 42 personal and corporate account
relationships linked to Abacha family members and close associates in
the UK. These accounts were held at 23 banks which included UK
banks and branches of banks from both inside and outside the
European Union.94 As a result of the investigation the FSA concluded
that 15 out of the 23 banks had significant weaknesses in their AML
systems.95 The banks were forced to improve their policies under strict
supervision by the FSA.96 A second illustration was a joint operation
with law enforcement agencies in Northern Ireland.97 Here, the FSA
investigated whether Northern Ireland Insurance Brokers Limited and
its directors were involved in money laundering. The investigation
identified £8m which appeared to have been laundered through the
firm. As a result of the investigation, the FSA ordered this firm to
cease from undertaking several regulated activities.98 After these two
high profile early examples of how the FSA has utilised its
investigatory powers to combat money laundering, little has happened
since.
Enforcement within the context of FSMA 2000 incorporates two
broad concepts. Firstly, preventing those who are not authorised to
conduct banking or investment business; and secondly, to ensure that
those who are authorised to conduct such businesses do so properly.99
89 J. Bagge, ‘‘The Future for Enforcement under the new Financial Services Authority’’ (1998) 19
Company Lawyer 194–197, at 195.
90 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, ss. 165–166.
91 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, ss. 167–168.
92 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 169.
93 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 172.
94 FSA Press Release, FSA publishes results of money laundering investigation, FSA/PN/029/2001,
March 8 2001, available from www.fsa.gov.uk.
95 Ibid.
96 A. Whitehouse, ‘‘A Brave New World: the Impact of Domestic and International Regulation on
Money Laundering Prevention in the UK’’ (2003) 11 Journal of Financial Regulation and
Compliance 138–145, at 140.
97 FSA Press Release, FSA acts with Police on money laundering concerns, FSA/PN/061/2002,
May 30 2002, available from www.fsa.gov.uk.
98 Ibid.
99 See note 89 above at p. 194.
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Under FSMA 2000 the FSA has become a prosecuting authority in
respect of certain money laundering offences.100 These powers apply
whether or not the entity to be prosecuted is actually regulated by the
FSA and they are therefore, the most important aspects of the FSA’s
obligation to reduce money laundering.101 The FSA also has the power
to impose a financial penalty where it establishes that there has been a
contravention by an authorised person of any requirement imposed
under FSMA 2000.102 The FSA has imposed a series of fines on firms
who have breached ML, even where there was no evidence of money
laundering. For example, the FSA fined the Royal Bank of Scotland
£750,000,103 Investment Services UK Limited £175,000,104 Raiffeisen
Zentralbank £150,000,105 Northern Bank £1.25m,106 the Bank of
Ireland £375,000107 and the Abbey National £2.2m.108 The level of the
fines is doubtlessly politically satisfying to some, yet it raises an
important question, are the fines having any effect? A 2005 study
conducted into firms’ attitudes towards AML regulations revealed
that the vast majority of them complied with the AML obligations not
because they perceive it as representing good practice or as combating
money laundering, but only because of the threat of sanctions.109
Approximately two-thirds of UK respondents thought that the level of
regulation is too severe for the risks involved in their sector.110
Therefore, despite the protestations from the regulated sector, it
100 FSA, Money Laundering: the FSA’s New Role – Consultation Paper 46 (London 2000).
101 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 402 (1)(a).
102 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 206 (1).
103 FSA Press Release, FSA Fines Royal Bank of Scotland £750,000 for money laundering control
failings, FSA/PN/123/2002, December 17 2002, available from www.fsa.gov.uk. The FSA
determined that the Royal Bank of Scotland had breached Rules 3.1.3 of the Money Laundering
Rules, which provides that a ‘‘A relevant firm must take reasonable steps to find out who its
client is by obtaining sufficient evidence of the identity of any client who comes into contact with
the relevant firm to be able to show that the client is who he claims to be’’. See note 54 above at
section 3.
104 FSA Press Release, FSA fines bond broker and managing director for anti-money laundering
failures, FSA/PN/117/2005, November 9 2005, available from www.fsa.gov.uk.
105 FSA Press Release, FSA Fines Raiffeisen Zentralbank £150,000 for money laundering control
failings, FSA/PN/035/2004, April 6 2004, available from www.fsa.gov.uk. The FSA concluded
that Raiffeisen Zentralbank B had contravened Rule 3.1.3 and 2.1.1 of the ML. See note 54
above at sections 2 and 3.
106 FSA Press Release, FSA Fines Northern Bank £1,250,000 for money laundering control failings,
FSA/PN/084/2003, August 7 2003, available from www.fsa.gov.uk. The FSA concluded that
Northern Bank had contravened Rules 3.1.3 of the ML. See note 54 above at section 3.
107 FSA Press Release, FSA Fines Bank of Ireland £375,000 for money laundering control failings,
FSA/PN/077/2004, September 2 2004, available from www.fsa.gov.uk. The FSA concluded that
the Bank of Ireland’s failures demonstrated a material breach of Rule 3.2.6 of the FSA’s Senior
Management Arrangements, Systems & Controls Rules. See also FSA, Final Notice, The
Governor and the Company of the Bank of Ireland (London 2004).
108 FSA Press Release, FSA Fines Abbey National £2,320,000 for money laundering control
failings, FSA/PN/132/2003, December 10 2003, available from www.fsa.gov.uk. Here, the FSA
concluded that Abbey National had contravened Rule 3.2.6, 3.1.3 and 4.3.2 of the FSA’s Senior
Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls Rules. See note 54 above at sections 3 and 4.
109 See note 1 above at p. 44.
110 R. Sarker, ‘‘Anti-Money Laundering Requirements: Too much Pain for too little Gain’’ (2006)
27 Company Lawyer 250–251, at 251.
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appears that the mere threat of financial sanctions by the FSA compels
firms to comply with the AML regulations. This approach could be
described as heavy handed. Nonetheless, it is having the desired effect
and it would take a very brave firm to hold up their hands and publicly
admit they were not compliant with the FSA regulations aimed at
reducing money laundering.
D. Suspicious Activity Reports
The final aspect of the FSA’s policy towards the reduction of money
laundering is the SARs regime, which is the most traditional
mechanism used to combat money laundering. It has been argued
that such regulations are the most important weapon in the fight
against money laundering.111 The SARs system has been in place for
many years and it was first introduced by the DTOA 1986.112 This Act
was amended in 1993 by the Criminal Justice Act, which gave effect to
the first European Directive on Money Laundering, and it introduced
the concept of mandatory reporting.113 The requirements of manda-
tory reporting have since been amended by the PCA 2002.114 ML 4.3.2
required the regulated sector to complete an SAR where they knew or
suspected, or they had reasonable grounds to know or suspect that a
person had been engaged in money laundering.115 The reporting
requirements under ML were divided into two subsections – internal
and external. As part of the external reporting requirements, the
MLRO, once in possession of an internal report, must make the report
to SOCA, if there are grounds for suspicion.116 Once the SAR has been
received by SOCA, they will ultimately determine whether or not to
pass the information on to the police for further investigation.117 The
overall effectiveness of the SARs regime has been questioned. For
instance, a report by the accountancy firm KPMG identified a number
of deficiencies within the reporting requirements,118 and made a series
of recommendations aimed at improving the monitoring of law
111 N. C. Morrison, ‘‘Money Laundering Legislation in the UK’’ (1995) 14 International Banking
and Financial Law 3–6, at 4.
112 For a more detailed discussion of this legislation see the excellent commentary by R. Stokes and
A. Arora, ‘‘The Duty to Report under the Money Laundering Legislation within the United
Kingdom’’ [2004] Journal of Business Law 332–356.
113 See J. Wadsley, ‘‘Money Laundering: Professionals as Policemen’’ (1994) 58 Conveyancer 275–
288.
114 M. Isaacs, ‘‘Money Laundering Dilemmas for Banks’’ (2004) 19 Journal of International
Banking Law and Regulation 284–288, at 284.
115 M. H. Fleming, UK Law Enforcement Agency Use and Management of Suspicious Activity
Reports: Towards Determining the Value of the Regime (London 2005).
116 For a more detailed discussion of what amounts to suspicion see R. Bosworth-Davies, ‘‘CJA
1993: Money Laundering’’ (1994) 15 Company Lawyer 56–58.
117 SOCA, Review of the Suspicious Activity Reports Regime (London 2006), at p. 5.
118 KPMG, Money Laundering: Review of the Reporting System (London 2003), at p. 14. The
deficiencies according to KPMG were the SARs database, the monitoring of enforcement
outcomes, inadequate training and the lack of government support for the scheme.
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enforcement outcomes and the provision of training in relation to
SARs.119 Fleming also noted that SARs were under-used by law
enforcement agencies.120 In particular, he criticised the regime because
law enforcement bodies continue to have poor management informa-
tion on how SARs are utilised.121 The Lander Review noted several
weaknesses of the regime including a lack of overall management and
responsibility of the scheme, inconsistent reporting by the regulated
sector and inappropriate training.122 The reporting requirements under
ML have created a fear factor amongst the regulated sector and it
resulted in a 35,000 increase in the number of SARs submitted to the
National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) in 2004.123 The increase
is directly attributable to the threat of sanctions by the FSA, which
had resulted in over-reporting to NCIS. This has led to the regulated
sector adopting a tactic that has been referred to as ‘‘defensive’’ or
‘‘preventative’’ reporting.124 However, it must be noted that the
increase in the number of SARs has also been influenced by legislative
changes and an increase in the range and number of entities who are
required to report by the FSA. By comparison, there has also been an
increase in the number of SARs submitted by financial institutions in
the US to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN),
largely due to the onerous reporting requirements imposed by Title III
of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 2001. In 2006
the FINCEN reported that US financial institutions filed 919,230
SARs, an increase of 37% when compared to the number of reports
filed in 2004.125 Therefore, it is also clear that US financial institutions
have adopted a defensive reporting mechanism to avoid the imposition
of financial sanctions.
The banking sector has raised concerns about the SAR regime,126
and some commentators have suggested that the reporting require-
ments should be abandoned and that the resources should be
119 Ibid., pp. 17–20. The report recommended the establishment of a Task Force drawn from the
public and private sectors to implement the recommendations, a complete overhaul of the
Economic Crime Branch within NCIS, improving the quality of reporting and improving the
results of use of SARs by law enforcement agencies.
120 See note 115 above at p. 48.
121 Ibid.
122 See note 117 above at p. 16–17.
123 Sarker, note 110 above, at 251. KPMG reported that the number of SARs submitted between
1995 and 2002 increased from 5,000 to 60,000. See note 118 above at p. 14.
124 See note 27 above at p. 142.
125 FINCEN, The SAR Activity Review – By the Numbers (Washington 2006), at p. 1. For a more
detailed assessment and commentary about the US SARs regime see FINCEN, 1st Review of the
Suspicious Activity Reporting Systems (Washington 1998) and N. Ryder ‘‘A False Sense of
Security? An Analysis of Legislative Approaches to the Prevention of Terrorist Finance in the
United States of America and the United Kingdom’’ [2007] Journal of Business Law 821–850, at
835–837.
126 Home Office, Report on the Operation in 2004 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (London 2004), at pp.
19–20.
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redirected elsewhere.127 The British Bankers Association claims that
their members annually spend £250m each year to comply with the
regulations.128 Conversely, KPMG estimated that annual the costs are
nearer £90m.129 Research has suggested that the AML costs in the UK
are higher than in other countries including Germany, France and
Italy.130 It must be noted that financial institutions in the US are also
experiencing a dramatic increase in the costs of complying with AML
regulations. Roberts reported that US institutions have spent over
$11bn to strengthen their internal AML controls.131 The safeguards
provided by the SARs regime can easily be avoided by the process of
smurfing. This is sometimes achieved by separating larger sums of
money into smaller amounts that can be deposited into several bank
accounts, thus avoiding financial institutions’ AML policies and
procedures.132 The effectiveness of the SARs regime is heavily reliant
upon the accuracy of the reports completed by the regulated sector
and the quality of the investigations by the police. The requirement for
the regulated sector to complete a SAR under ML made little sense
because they were legally required to do so under the under the MLR
1993.133
III. CONCLUSION
Section 6 is an innovative attempt to reduce the impact of money
laundering. It is the first time that a financial regulatory body in the
UK has been given such a specific role. To date the FSA has been
concerned with implementing a policy that occurs at the pre-placement
stage of the money laundering process. This has imposed an additional
127 Anon, ‘‘The Lost Trail – Efforts to Combat the Financing of Terrorism are Costly and
Ineffective’’ The Economist, 22 October 2005, available at www.economist.com.
128 Ibid. Alexander claims that the annual costs of the AML to banks in the UK are £650m per year.
See R. Alexander, Insider Dealing and Money Laundering in the EU: Law and Regulation,
(Aldershot 2007), p. 119.
129 See note 118 above at pp. 46–47. The exact costs of the SARs regime are impossible to calculate.
For an excellent commentary see P. A. Sproat, ‘‘The New Policing of Assets and the New Assets
of Policing: a Tentative Financial Cost-Benefit Analysis of the UKs Anti-Money Laundering
and Asset Recovery Regime’’ (2007) 10 Journal of Money Laundering Control 277–299, at 278–
288. For other estimates of the costs see FSA, Anti-Money Laundering Current Customer Review
Cost Benefit Analysis – Report Prepared by Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP (FSA 2003).
130 See note 1 above at p. 24.
131 M. Roberts, ‘‘Big Brother isn’t just Watching you, he’s also Wasting your Tax Payer Dollars: an
Analysis of the Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of the USA Patriot Act’’ (2004) 56 Rutgers
Law Review 573–602, at 592.
132 This process is commonly referred to as smurfing where criminals will deposit money in a
financial institution in amounts that are lower than the level at which the financial institution
must complete a suspicious activity report. See S. N. Welling, ‘‘Smurfs, Money Laundering, and
the Federal Criminal Law: the Crime of Structuring Transactions’’ (1989) 41 Florida Law
Review 287–339.
133 It must be noted that due to the amendments to ML and the transfer of the SARs regime from
NCIS to SOCA, firms are no longer required to submit an SAR to the FSA. The transfer of these
functions was contained in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, s.58 and Schedule
3.
650 The Cambridge Law Journal [2008]
burden on firms in the UK who are already required to comply with a
plethora of AML regulations. The obligations imposed ML do not
represent a change of substance because they are similar to those
contained in the 1993 MLR. This extension into the criminal law
sphere must be treated with caution because the FSA joins a long list
of regulatory and law enforcement agencies that target money
laundering. The common sense approach would be the creation of a
single agency rather than several, with a single set of AML rules. The
FSA has implemented a costly and at times unnecessarily complicated
AML regime, yet they have at least attempted to lessen the AML
obligations by implementing SYSC. Therefore, even if the FSA could
reduce money laundering how could it accurately be measured?
Furthermore, there are numerous mechanisms used by criminals to
hide their proceeds of crime, which makes it even more difficult for the
FSA to reduce the extent of money laundering. The scheme introduced
by the FSA will, in the main, do little to discourage well organised
criminals from laundering money in the UK. This article has identified
fours parts of the AML regime as having particular significance.
Risk Based Money Laundering Policy and Rule Making Powers
The objectives of the risk based money laundering policy were two
fold. Firstly, to reduce the compliance costs for the regulated sector,
and secondly, to lessen the burden on firms. In the first instance, the
policy has categorically failed. This is illustrated by a 60% increase in
the costs faced by the regulated sector in the last three years. The
amendments to ML introduced by the FSA in 2006 represent a
significant change in policy towards reducing money laundering. The
policy has moved from what this article refers to as a ‘‘heavy handed’’
approach towards a more conciliatory AML method. This must be
welcomed by the regulated sector. Furthermore, the amendments
circumvent the wasteful duplication of the AML obligations contained
in the 1993 MLR. The departure from the oppressive provisions of
ML does not mean that the FSA has softened its stance on money
laundering; it has attempted to introduce a more streamlined version
of ML. The new version provides the regulated sector with an
unprecedented level of flexibility which could prove to be vital in the
fight against money laundering.
Investigative and Enforcement Powers
It becomes clear from an examination of the relevant provisions of
FSMA that the FSA has extensive investigative and enforcement
powers. The FSA has concentrated upon its powers to impose
financial sanctions upon the regulated sector as opposed to seeking
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criminal prosecutions under the 2003 MLR. The imposition of
financial penalties has had its desired effect, to make the regulated
sector comply with the AML regulations. However, it can be
concluded that the threat of sanctions has led to a great deal of
resentment from the sector and scepticism as to whether the
regulations introduced by the FSA are reducing the level of money
laundering. The article suggests that the success of the enforcement
powers could be cynically measured in the total amount of the fine. It
is likely that headline figure of a £2m fine is politically satisfying to
some; it is not a true measure of effectiveness.
Suspicious Activities Reporting Regime
The reporting requirements under ML imposed significant adminis-
trative burdens on financial institutions that already had to comply
with reporting requirements under the PCA 2002 and the 2003 MLR.
ML has led to an increased level of record-keeping, report filing, and
internal policing requirements. The imposition of even more manda-
tory reporting requirements was inevitable given the government’s
tough stance towards money laundering. It is questionable however,
whether the filing of an SAR will make any difference given the
difficulties in securing prosecutions in money laundering offences.134 It
is also possible to argue that the reporting requirements under ML
have created a ‘‘needle-in-the-haystack’’ problem, especially given the
large number of SARs annually submitted. The SARs regime was
amended by the SOCPA 2005, which brought together the National
Crime Squad, NCIS, the investigative function of HM Customs and
Excise on drug trafficking and the related recovery of criminal assets
and the Home Offices responsibilities for organised crime, to form
SOCA. The government announced its intention to establish SOCA in
February 2004, following an extensive Home Office review of
organised crime.135 The most significant amendment to the SARs
regime is that SOCA has taken the over its management from NCIS.
The SOCPA 2005 has given SOCA three powers and tasks that are
pertinent to the role it inherited from NCIS.136 Firstly, the prevention
and detection of serious organised crime.137 Secondly, the mitigation of
the consequences of such crime.138 Thirdly, the function of gathering,
storing and analysing and disseminating of information.139 These
powers provide SOCA with the ability to share information and to
134 See note 4 above at pp. 204–206 and note 16 above at p. 157.
135 Home Office, One Step Ahead – A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime (London
2004). A copy of this report is available from www.homeoffice.gov.uk.
136 See note 117 above at p. 5.
137 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, s. 2(1)(a).
138 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, s. 2(1)(b).
139 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, s. 3.
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support exactly those partners who have a direct interest in using the
information contained in SARs. At this stage, the full impact of SOCA
upon the SARs regime is difficult to determine. SOCA must build
upon the recommendations made by the Lander Review and through
its new powers attempt to rebuild confidence in the SAR regime.
This article has sought to assess critically the effectiveness of the
measures introduced by the FSA to reduce the extent of money
laundering. The extent to which this statutory objective will work is
impossible to determine given the difficulties in calculating the actual
extent of money laundering. Furthermore, given the abundant number
of sources available to criminals to launder their proceeds of crime, the
effectiveness of this statutory objective will always be questioned.
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